“Only the Beginning, Only Just the Start . . . Mostly I’m Silent”: New Constitutional Challenges with Data Collection Devices Brought into the Home by Nackenoff, Carol
Maryland Law Review 
Volume 79 Issue 1 Article 5 
“Only the Beginning, Only Just the Start . . . Mostly I’m Silent”: New 
Constitutional Challenges with Data Collection Devices Brought 
into the Home 
Carol Nackenoff 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr 
Recommended Citation 
Carol Nackenoff, “Only the Beginning, Only Just the Start . . . Mostly I’m Silent”: New Constitutional 
Challenges with Data Collection Devices Brought into the Home, 79 Md. L. Rev. 88 (2019) 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr/vol79/iss1/5 
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM 
Carey Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Maryland Law Review by an authorized editor of 
DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contact smccarty@law.umaryland.edu. 
   
 
88 
“ONLY THE BEGINNING, ONLY JUST THE START . . . MOSTLY 
I’M SILENT”1: NEW CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES WITH 
DATA COLLECTION DEVICES BROUGHT INTO THE HOME 
CAROL NACKENOFF∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Last December, our son purchased a Google Assistant for my husband, 
who uses it to do very simple things—check the weather, play music, set a 
cooking timer, and ask questions such as who won the World Series in 2001 
(answer: the Arizona Diamondbacks).  Google Assistant (which disappoint-
ingly has no other name), Alexa (Amazon), Cortana (Microsoft), Siri (Ap-
ple), Google Home, and other artificial intelligence (“AI”) devices wait for 
the wake word and only seem to sleep.  They listen, and when summoned, 
respond.  These assistants get smarter each year.  Perhaps in the not very 
distant future, such devices can and will record for far longer than a minute.  
Digital assistants are everywhere: There are even voice-activated, self-driv-
ing refrigerators (which we must need in some sick universe so that someone 
can determine whether we grabbed a cold, hoppy IPA or an organic carrot).2  
Even without these specific digital assistants, most of us probably already 
live in smart homes with smart phones, cameras, TVs, toothbrushes, and 
beds, and have plenty of data collected by the Internet of Things.3  The col-
lection list expands further when we rove with smart cars and Fitbits.  We 
may even be unaware of the data collection capacities or defaults on some of 
the devices we willingly bring into our lives.4  The Internet of Things refers 
                                                                    
© 2019 Carol Nackenoff. 
 1.  The quotation is part of the lyrics of the Chicago Transit Authority song, written by Robert 
Lamm.  CHICAGO TRANSIT AUTHORITY, BEGINNINGS, on CHICAGO TRANSIT AUTHORITY (Colum-
bia Records, 1969).  
∗ Swarthmore College.  My research assistant, Gilbert Orbea ‘19, made it possible for me to 
understand more about this brave new world, and I could not have written this paper without his 
help.  He participated in the 2018 Schmooze and will be attending Yale Law School.  
 2.  Noah Friedman, Panasonic Revealed a Self-Driving Fridge—and It Comes to You When 
You Call It, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 6, 2017, 3:56 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/panasonic-
voice-activated-fridge-2017-9. 
 3.  Apparently, Android phones are especially good at passive data collection by comparison 
with the iPhone.  DOUGLAS C. SCHMIDT, GOOGLE DATA COLLECTION 14 (2018), https://digital-
contentnext.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/DCN-Google-Data-Collection-Paper.pdf.   
 4.  In some cases, the tracking-location feature default is “on” and the consumer has to inter-
vene to opt out.  Google tracks location history even if the user has turned it off.  See Emily Dreyfuss, 
Google Tracks You Even if Location History’s Off.  Here’s How to Stop It, WIRED  (Aug. 13, 2018, 
1:37 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/google-location-tracking-turn-off/. 
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to “networks of common devices that transmit data to each other through tiny 
radio sensors . . . [creating] in essence, self-cybersurveillance.”5  These de-
vices contribute to the enormous amounts of personal data many of us create 
for our own use—and for use by others.  “Activities that were once private 
or shared with the few now leave trails of data that expose our interests, traits, 
beliefs, and intentions.”6 
By one estimate, fifty to seventy-five billion devices worldwide may be 
connected on the Internet of Things by 2020, revealing patterns of daily life. 7  
As early as 2008, the National Intelligence Council’s report on Disruptive 
Civil Technologies envisioned that by 2025, there would exist an Internet of 
Things consisting of “everyday objects, that are readable, recognizable, lo-
catable, addressable, and/or controllable via the Internet.”8  As one recent 
scholar writes, “‘Smart’ devices radiate data,” making it at least technologi-
cally possible to track nearly everything.9  There is even a hashtag for this 
phenomenon: #sensorveillance.10 
Probably the most popularly used term today, however, is “surveillance 
capitalism,” a term coined by Professor Shoshana Zuboff because human ex-
perience is unilaterally claimed “as free raw material for translation into be-
havioral data.”11  Almost two decades ago, Google became the pioneer in 
capturing behavioral data for use beyond service improvement—what Pro-
fessor Zuboff terms “behavioral surplus”;12 we now find the proliferation of 
“new surveillance-based ecosystems in virtually every economic sector.”13 
                                                                    
 5.  Steven I. Friedland, The Internet of Things and Self-Surveillance Systems, in THE 
CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF SURVEILLANCE LAW 198, 198 (David Gray & Stephen E. Henderson 
eds., 2017). 
 6.  Alessandro Acquisti et al., Privacy and Human Behavior in the Age of Information, 347 
SCI. 509, 509 (2015). 
 7.  Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The ‘Smart’ Fourth Amendment, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 547, 
551 (2017) (citing Tony Danova, Morgan Stanley: 75 Billion Devices Will Be Connected to the 
Internet of Things by 2020, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 2, 2013, 4:16 PM), http://www.busi-
nessinsider.com/75-billion-devices-will-be-connected-to-the-internet-by-2020-2013-10). 
 8.  NAT’L INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, DISRUPTIVE CIVIL TECHNOLOGIES: SIX TECHNOLOGIES 
WITH POTENTIAL IMPACTS ON US INTERESTS OUT TO 2025 F-1 (2008), fas.org/irp/nic/disrup-
tive.pdf. 
 9.  Ferguson, supra note 7, at 547. 
 10.  The term seems to have been coined by Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, who uses and claims to 
have originated this term for data trails in The ‘Smart’ Fourth Amendment.  Ferguson, supra note 7. 
 11.  SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM 8 (2019) [hereinafter 
ZUBOFF, SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM].  For the origin of the term, see Shoshana Zuboff, A Digital 
Declaration, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE (Sept. 15, 2014, 11:03 AM), https://www.faz.net/ak-
tuell/feuilleton/debatten/the-digital-debate/shoshan-zuboff-on-big-data-as-surveillance-capitalism-
13152525.html.   
 12.  ZUBOFF, SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM, supra note 11, at 74–75. 
 13.  John Laidler, High Tech is Watching You, HARV. GAZETTE (Mar. 4, 2019), 
https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2019/03/harvard-professor-says-surveillance-capitalism-is-
undermining-democracy/ (interviewing Shoshana Zuboff). 
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Google continues to innovate with home devices.  Google Home can 
play audio from your phone, show your favorite personal photos on a smart 
TV screen (think Jeff Bezos and Anthony Weiner),14 plan your day, create 
your shopping list (“ok Google, I need to buy pseudoephedrine for my base-
ment meth lab”), control other smart devices in your home, call businesses 
and friends, cook your favorite recipes, and remember things you tell it to 
(“ok Google, remember that I socked $20,000 inside my left Wellington boot 
in the upstairs hall closet”).  It can send text messages and (through If This 
Then That15) send e-mail.  And it allows its owner to voice shop: “What could 
be dreamier than to speak and have it be so?”16 
“Google collects all Google Assistant queries, whether audio or typed.  
It also collects the location where the query occurred.”17  Google Assistant is 
apparently available on at least 400 million devices, including speakers and 
some wireless headphones produced by third parties, and Google can collect 
data from all of these.18 
What these devices hear—and keep—is based on proprietary algo-
rithms.  Americans are already being sentenced based in part on data col-
lected by algorithm.19  More than a decade ago, Professor Jack Balkin recog-
nized, “[t]he Algorithmic Society features the collection of vast amounts of 
data about individuals and facilitates new forms of surveillance, control, dis-
                                                                    
 14.  Regarding Google Photos, “Google records the time and GPS coordinates for every photo 
taken.  Google uploads images to the Google cloud and conducts image analysis to identify a broad 
set of objects, such as modes of transportation, animals, logos, landmarks, text, and faces.”  
SCHMIDT, supra note 3, at 33.  However, unless the user gives the app permission, Google will not 
provide data distinguishing among individual people.  Id.  Jeff Bezos and Anthony Weiner provide 
two prominent, recent examples of public figures who lost control of personal photos.  See James 
Ball, Jeff Bezos’ Photos Show That No One’s Intimate Selfies Are Safe, and That They Aren’t a Big 
Deal, NBC NEWS THINK (Feb. 8, 2019, 1:04 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/jeff-
bezos-photos-show-no-one-s-intimate-selfies-are-ncna969376; Michael Gold, Anthony Weiner Re-
leased from Prison After Serving 18 Months for Sexting Teenager, N.Y. TIMES (May 14, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/14/nyregion/anthony-weiner-prison-release.html (reporting on 
the former U.S. Congressman’s sexting behavior, imprisonment, and release). 
 15.  IFTTT, or “If This Then That” involves triggers and actions using chains of simple condi-
tional statements.  With an IFTTT account, the user employs apps and recipes, allowing Alexa or 
Google Assistant to sync with other smart home devices that were not designed to work well with 
each other.  IFTTT permits fast on-demand automation of tasks, such as making coffee, powering 
on an entertainment system, locking doors, finding an iPhone, sending a shopping list to a phone, 
and setting up reminders.  IFTTT, https://ifttt.com/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2019). 
 16.  ZUBOFF, SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM, supra note 11, at 261.  
 17.  SCHMIDT, supra note 3, at 32.   
 18.  Id. at 33. 
 19.  Eric Loomis was sent to jail in Wisconsin based in part on predictions of future violent 
action generated by an algorithm.  See Adam Liptak, Sent to Prison by a Software Program’s Secret 
Algorithms, N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/01/us/politics/sent-to-
prison-by-a-software-programs-secret-algorithms.html. 
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crimination and manipulation, both by governments and by private compa-
nies,” and called this “the problem of Big Data.”20  The existence of big data 
creates incentives and temptations for bulk data collection by the federal gov-
ernment and law enforcement officials, in the name of keeping us safe from 
terrorist attacks and from criminals.21  “Government’s increasing use of sur-
veillance and data mining is a predictable result of accelerating developments 
in information technology.”22  Policymakers crave certainty, control in the 
face of volatility, and seek to turn “unmeasurable uncertainty into measura-
ble risk.”23 
While government and corporate collection and use of big data may ap-
pear to be quite separate, there are areas of convergence, and a number of 
common constitutional and political issues.  As Professor Andrew Guthrie 
Ferguson views the matter: 
[P]rivate big data companies are suctioning up vast streams of con-
sumer data to target individuals or families for commercial gain.  
Law enforcement agencies are building information centers to col-
lect, aggregate, and disseminate criminal records data and other 
forms of biometric data and locational data for investigative ad-
vantage.  While developing along separate evolutionary paths, 
these collection and aggregation systems have begun overlapping 
in practice. . . . Private companies sell personal data to law en-
forcement.  Law enforcement integrates this information with pub-
licly available data.  Databases merge, blend, and share related pri-
vate-public data.24 
Stated starkly, “What was once private-consumer data can quite easily be 
repurposed as the raw material for law enforcement databases.  At the most 
                                                                    
 20.  Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech in the Algorithmic Society: Big Data, Private Governance, 
and New School Speech Regulation, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1149, 1153 (2018). 
 21.  See Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Processes of Constitutional Change: From 
Partisan Entrenchment to the National Surveillance State, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 489, 522–25 
(2006) (discussing the parallel track criminal law could take). 
 22.  Jack M. Balkin, The Constitution in the National Surveillance State, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1, 
3 (2008). 
 23.  Gernot Rieder, Tracing Big Data Imaginaries Through Public Policy, in THE POLITICS OF 
BIG DATA: BIG DATA, BIG BROTHER? 89, 97 (Ann Rudinow Sætnan et al. eds., 2018).  
 24.  Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big Data Surveillance: The Convergence of Big Data and Law 
Enforcement, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF SURVEILLANCE LAW, supra note 5, at 171; see 
also Friedland, supra note 5, at 216 (“[A] critical point of government access to self-generated data 
occurs through public-private partnerships, whereby the government intentionally aligns with com-
panies to obtain data.”).  According to Professor Friedland, companies sometimes agree to weak 
encryption software products that government can break.  See id. at 216; see also Ryan Sabalow, 
Indiana State Police Tracking Cellphones—but Won’t Say How or Why, INDIANAPOLIS STAR (Dec. 
9, 2013, 1:18 PM), https://www.indystar.com/story/news/2013/12/08/indiana-state-police-tracking-
cellphones-but-wont-say-how-or-why/3908333/. 
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basic level, law enforcement has simply become another customer for big 
data information.”25 
A.  Smart Home Devices, the Constitution, and the Supreme Court 
In this Essay, I focus on the collection of data from the devices we bring 
into our homes, though the questions raised apply to a wider array of data and 
data collection techniques.  Current definitions of privacy and assumptions 
about the right to privacy in the home are inadequate to deal with challenges 
posed by “smart home” devices.26  The question of who has property rights 
to data collected from home assistants is also provocative.  According to one 
recent examination of such challenges, as we bring more devices capable of 
“spying” into the home, “often these smart objects are linked to data streams 
or other devices that leave the home—thereby literally taking private matters 
into public space.”27  But this claim assumes that we know, or should know 
clearly, what matters are private in this brave new world. 
The devices in our homes have been described as part commodity, part 
property, and part expression.28  What kind of expectations of privacy should 
purchasers of personal assistant devices have when they bring them into the 
home?  What should—and should not—be protected speech in the era of 
smart speakers, cars, appliances, cameras, and cellphones connected to the 
internet that can “talk” to each other?  Who owns and controls the data that 
our Google Assistant and similar devices collect?  The answer is not simple 
when bundles of data points are bought and sold in the marketplace.  Clearly, 
big data is also big business.29  To offer up an example, a U.S. data broker 
known as Acxiom “collects, analyses and trades vast amounts of consumer 
information, and combines their client’s customer data with data of other 
sources.  Acxiom claims to provide access to up to 5,000 data elements on 
700 million people worldwide,” and has customers in Europe as well as the 
United States, providing services that include data and marketing, risk miti-
gation, fraud detection, and identity verification.30  When owners of home 
assistants use them to make purchases, monitor their health, order up a ride 
                                                                    
 25.  Ferguson, supra note 24, at 189. 
 26.  Lisa van Dongen & Tjerk Timan, Your Smart Coffee Machine Knows What You Did Last 
Summer: A Legal Analysis of the Limitations of Traditional Privacy of the Home Under Dutch Law 
in the Era of Smart Technology, 14 SCRIPTED 208, 210–11 (2017), https://script-ed.org/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2017/12/vandongen_timan.pdf. 
 27.  Id. at 208. 
 28.  Ferguson, supra note 7, at 549. 
 29.  See KHIARA M. BRIDGES, THE POVERTY OF PRIVACY RIGHTS 133–79 (2017). 
 30.  Ingrid Schneider, Bringing the State Back in: Big Data-Based Capitalism, Disruption, and 
Novel Regulatory Approaches in Europe, in THE POLITICS OF BIG DATA: BIG DATA, BIG 
BROTHER?, supra note 23, at 138 (citing WOLFIE CHRISTL, CRACKED LABS, CORPORATE 
SURVEILLANCE IN EVERYDAY LIFE (2017), https://crackedlabs.org/dl/CrackedLabs_Christl_Cor-
porateSurveillance.pdf). 
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on Uber, or are detected engaging in potential criminal activity, some of these 
activities become datapoints that companies collect and resell.31 
What about Fourth Amendment protections for “persons, houses, pa-
pers, and effects”?32  Professors David Gray and Danielle Citron claim that 
“[t]he Fourth Amendment was conceived, and has long served, as a bulwark 
against law enforcement’s teleological tendency toward a surveillance state” 
and should play an important role in the face of growing surveillance capac-
ity.33  However, what constitutes a search or seizure at law changes, and tech-
nology may play a role.  As Professor Mark Graber notes, “Controversies 
over what constitutes an unconstitutional search are driven by expansions in 
state capacity to see. . . .  New devices permit government officials to see 
what they could not previously see.”34  The very notion of home morphs: 
“That our walls are dense and deep is of no importance now because the 
boundaries that define the very experience of home are to be erased. . . .  Big 
Other swallows refuge whole, along with” any notion of home as sanctuary.35 
Are data gathered from devices such as Google Assistant or Alexa any 
part of the property of the persons who rely upon them?  Who can claim a 
right to shield such data from search and seizure?  While the term “persons” 
has generally been understood to mean “the human body and the information 
located on and around the human body,”36 is some part of the “personal” 
involved when information is collected in the home and residing on servers 
somewhere?  What are “reasonable expectations of privacy” in terms of in-
formational security in a “sensorveillance” world?37  Is such protection as the 
Court is willing to consider the protection of person, place (phone booth), or 
thing (trash bags on the curb, a purchased device)?38 
Despite the existence for some time of bulk electronic data collection 
from items we have purchased and a few Supreme Court decisions of note on 
new data collection techniques, such as Kyllo v. United States,39 United States 
                                                                    
 31.  See, e.g., Derrick Harris, The One-Night Stand, Quantified and Visualized by Uber, 
GIGAOM (Mar. 26, 2012, 4:05 PM), https://gigaom.com/2012/03/26/uber-one-night-stands/. 
 32.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 33.  David Gray & Danielle Citron, The Right to Quantitative Privacy, 98 MINN. L. REV. 62, 
69, 92 (2013). 
 34.  Mark A. Graber, Seeing, Seizing, and Searching Like a State, in THE CAMBRIDGE 
HANDBOOK OF SURVEILLANCE LAW, supra note 5, at 417. 
 35.  ZUBOFF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM, supra note 11, at 478. 
 36.  Ferguson, supra note 7, at 590. 
 37.  Id. at 549 (posing these questions). 
 38.  Person, Place, or Thing was a once-popular noun game. 
 39.  533 U.S. 27 (2001).  In a 5-4 decision written by Justice Scalia (joined by Justices Thomas, 
Breyer, and Ginsburg, who remain on the Court in 2019), the Court held that a heat-sensing device 
aimed at a home to detect marijuana growing inside constituted an unconstitutional search.  Id. at 
40 (“Where, as here, the Government uses a device that is not in general public use, to explore 
details of the home that would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the 
surveillance is a ‘search’ and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.”) . 
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v. Jones,40 Riley v. California,41 and Carpenter v. United States,42 I contend 
there is relatively little we currently know about where the Court is going on 
such matters, whether they are interpreting the Stored Communications Act 
(1986),43 relying on other statutory authority, or drawing upon precedents in 
First and Fourth Amendment case law.  The most I think we can say clearly 
at the moment is that the Chief Justice seems reluctant to grant wide powers 
to government and law enforcement officials in the name of the third-party 
doctrine, and that he has sided with the Court’s liberals in rejecting some data 
searches that may prove relevant to matters involving  Alexa and Google As-
sistant. 
B.  Of Trash Bags and Cell Phone Data 
For a number of years, the Court has been following the third-party doc-
trine, which holds that our personal data, when entrusted to the companies 
that provide services to us, fall outside the Fourth Amendment’s protection 
(government agencies do not need to get a warrant or show probable cause to 
obtain that data).  After Katz, this third-party doctrine developed in United 
States v. Miller44 and Smith v. Maryland45 to hold that “a person has no legit-
imate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third 
parties.”46  Thus, it seems that when the government wants to obtain your 
information, if you have voluntarily entrusted your personal data to compa-
nies providing you services, the government does not need a search war-
rant—the Fourth Amendment is not triggered and the government has con-
siderable latitude in its search. 
                                                                    
 40.  565 U.S. 400 (2012) (holding that installation of a GPS tracking device on a motor vehicle 
and using that information to monitor the vehicle’s movements constituted a search, requiring a 
warrant).  The decision was unanimous, and Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion.  Justice So-
tomayor’s concurrence stresses how physical intrusion on property is no longer necessary for many 
forms of surveillance and that data surveillance should remain subject to the Katz test.  Id. at 416–
17 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (noting that with monitoring and long-term storage of data “the gov-
ernment’s unrestrained power to assemble data that reveal private aspects of identity is susceptible 
to abuse”).  Justice Sotomayor signaled the third-party doctrine is ill-suited to the digital age.  Id. 
 41.  573 U.S. 373 (2014).  In a unanimous decision, with majority opinion written by Chief 
Justice Roberts, the Court held that the search and seizure of Riley’s cell phone without a warrant 
was an unconstitutional search.  In the opinion, the Chief Justice quoted Justice Sotomayor’s Jones 
concurrence: “GPS monitoring generates a precise, comprehensive record of a person’s public 
movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her familial, political, professional, religious, and 
sexual associations.”  Id. at 396 (quoting Jones, 565 U.S. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring)).  
 42.  138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018); see infra notes 53–65 and accompanying text.  
 43.  The Stored Communications Act provides language about when warrants are needed and 
when subpoenas are sufficient in collecting data from internet service providers and covers volun-
tary and compelled disclosure of data.  18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–12 (2012).  
 44.  425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
 45.  442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
 46.  Id. at 743–44; see also Miller, 425 U.S. at 435; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
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Some Supreme Court Justices simply contend that there is no personal 
property interest in electronic records for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.  
Thus, Justice Thomas wrote in his dissent in Carpenter v. United States,  
“[T]he Government did not search Carpenter’s property.  He did not create 
the records, he does not maintain them, he cannot control them, and he cannot 
destroy them.”47  In one of Justice Kennedy’s final cases, he also reasoned in 
his dissent  that Carpenter did not have any legitimate expectation of privacy 
in his records because he neither owned nor controlled his cell phone rec-
ords.48  While Justice Alito’s position is more complicated than my charac-
terization here, he is concerned about how limitations on the third-party doc-
trine might hamstring law enforcement in their valuable and legitimate 
investigative practices.49  Justice Kavanaugh’s record includes a considerable 
number of opinions favoring law enforcement and government surveillance 
interests, including allowing bulk collection of telephone data (Klayman v. 
Obama50) and the use of GPS tracking devices in a case that would become 
United States v. Jones.51  According to one analyst of his opinions for the 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, “[i]n a 
close case that requires balancing of interests, the cases suggest, [Justice] Ka-
vanaugh is more likely to approach the case from the government’s perspec-
tive than from the individual’s perspective.”52  It is certainly likely that the 
newest Justice will continue to favor the surveillance state for the foreseeable 
future. 
However, another line of argument has gained some traction with less 
conservative Justices.  In her influential Jones concurrence, Justice So-
tomayor worried about government’s increasing capacity to collect electronic 
data on many aspects of a person’s life, altering the relationship between cit-
izen and government.  She argued that the third-party doctrine was “ill suited 
to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of information about 
                                                                    
 47.  Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2235 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting).  For 
Thomas, “[t]he Katz test has no basis in the text or history of the Fourth Amendment.”  Id. at 2236.  
 48.  Id. at 2226–27, 2229 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).   
 49.  See id. at 2247, 2255–57 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 50.  805 F.3d 1148 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
 51.  Justice Kavanaugh thought the placement of the GPS device on the appellant’s Jeep might 
not constitute a search; he wanted the case reheard.  See United States v. Jones, 625 F.3d 766, 769 
(D.C. Cir. 2010) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting), aff’d in part, 565 U.S. 400 (2012).  The case was 
called United States v. Maynard when it was originally before the D.C. Circuit on appeal. Professor 
Orrin Kerr believes Justice Kavanaugh’s position in Klayman v. Obama, 805 F.3d 1148 (D.C. Cir. 
2015), a solo concurrence denying an en banc rehearing, was technically correct prior to Carpen-
ter—i.e., that the metadata the NSA was receiving from phone calls (numbers dialed but not con-
tents) was consistent with the Supreme Court holding in Smith.  Orin Kerr, Judge Kavanaugh on 
the Fourth Amendment, SCOTUSBLOG, (July 20, 2018, 6:16 PM), https://www.sco-
tusblog.com/2018/07/judge-kavanaugh-on-the-fourth-amendment/; see also Jonathan Hafetz, 
Judge Kavanaugh’s Record in National-Security Cases, SCOTUSBLOG (Aug. 29, 2018, 11:02 
AM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2018/08/judge-kavanaughs-record-in-national-security-cases/. 
 52.  Kerr, supra note 51.   
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themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks.”53  
“[I]t may be necessary,” she wrote, “to reconsider the premise that an indi-
vidual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily 
disclosed to third parties.”54  Aspects of her concurrence were quoted or cited 
by Chief Justice Roberts in the majority opinions he authored in both Riley 
v. California  and Carpenter v. United States.55  Chief Justice Roberts is, at 
present, the swing vote when the Court divides on such data privacy cases as 
have come under consideration. 
Last term’s decision in Carpenter recognized that cell phones and their 
services constitute “‘such a pervasive and insistent part of daily life’ that car-
rying one is indispensable to participation in modern society.”56  At issue was 
whether a person ceded all control over cell site location information 
(“CSLI”) derived from his or her cell phone during the extended time of a 
string of robberies.  The Court’s bare majority, in an opinion written by Chief 
Justice Roberts, drew upon remarks in the Justice Sotomayor concurrence in 
Jones to “hold that an individual maintains a legitimate expectation of pri-
vacy in the record of his physical movements.”57  A week of data was too 
much for the government to obtain without a warrant—although we do not 
know by how much.58 
The decision left more questions unanswered than answered, and Justice 
Alito (in dissent) was probably right in asserting that the Court’s reasoning 
“guarantees a blizzard of litigation.”59  Perhaps the Carpenter decision made 
Professor Cass Sunstein very happy: the Court was “muddling through” on 
relatively new terrain and seemed satisfied with a minimalist decision.60  The 
majority opinion seemed, minimally, to carve out an exception to digital age 
third-party doctrine (or declined to extend the third-party doctrine to digital 
data of this sort) when locational data are collected automatically and com-
prehensively; the majority also did express concern about arbitrary police 
power.  Left unanswered was the question of what kinds of data might be 
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 59.  Id. at 2247  (Alito, J., dissenting).  
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COURT (1999); Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of Muddling Through, 19 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 78 
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excepted from the third-party doctrine.  The practice prior to Carpenter, un-
der the Stored Communications Act, asked that federal or state government 
“offer[] specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable 
grounds to believe that the contents of a wire or electronic communication, 
or the records or other information sought, are relevant and material to an 
ongoing criminal investigation.”61 
In reading tea leaves for the future, however, perhaps the most interest-
ing opinion in Carpenter was the dissent by Justice Gorsuch.  Justice Gorsuch 
expressed his dislike for Smith and Miller and the reasonable expectation of 
privacy approach in Katz; he felt the majority opinion in Carpenter revised 
third-party doctrine, keeping Smith and Miller “on life support.”62 
Deciding what privacy interests should be recognized often calls 
for a pure policy choice, many times between incommensurable 
goods—between the value of privacy in a particular setting and so-
ciety’s interest in combating crime.  Answering questions like that 
calls for the exercise of raw political will belonging to legislatures, 
not the legal judgment proper to courts.63 
Wanting to jettison the third-party doctrine and expressing great skepti-
cism in reliance on personal judicial whim about what expectations of pri-
vacy were reasonable,64 he therefore dissented.  But in embracing what he 
called a more traditional approach to the Fourth Amendment, he envisioned 
a broader scope for Fourth Amendment rights.  Justice Gorsuch argued that 
protections for your person, house, papers, and effects do not automatically 
disappear just because you share records with a third party.65  It will be inter-
esting to see whether he becomes a leader in shaping Court opinion about big 
data searches and privacy rights. 
II.  HAPPY TRAILS AND OTHER POINTS 
I end with a few thoughts about five problems or issues I envision for 
the near future as we grow ever closer to our smart devices. 
A.  Reasonable Expectations of Privacy? 
It seems that many Americans are willing to trade away privacy and 
information security in order to participate in this brave new world of smart 
devices and enjoy their conveniences.  In Katz, Justice Harlan’s concurrence 
introduced the language of “reasonable expectation of privacy,” the measure 
                                                                    
 61.  18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2012). 
 62.  Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2272 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
 63.  Id. at 2265. 
 64.  Id.   
 65.  Id. at 2270 (suggesting the use of technology, including storing data with third parties, may 
well be “functionally compelled by the demands of modern life”). 
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of which seemed to be whether “the expectation be one that society is pre-
pared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”66  We must, of course, ask whether this 
standard, which has been often relied upon since Katz, is adequate (for rea-
sons somewhat different from Justice Gorsuch’s concerns, discussed 
above).67  If Americans share all sorts of information with friends and 
strangers, caring less about privacy than they used to (what is it with Jeff 
Bezos, anyway? 68), is less privacy the twenty-first century’s “reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy?”69  To be perversely Justice Scalia-like,70 should the 
standard simply be contemporary community expectations if most of us be-
come data exhibitionists?  If we are indifferent to big data collection, does 
that make data trails “happy trails?”71  That doesn’t seem to be a good answer. 
This characterization of privacy attitudes is, of course, too cavalier.  The 
time it would take for an average internet user to read all the privacy policies 
of each website she or he visited in a year is staggering.72  As one recent 
commentator notes, “To fully apprehend our vulnerabilities as digital crea-
tures would require far too much time and energy.  More than that: It would 
require an entirely new set of instincts . . . .”73  Furthermore, so much infor-
mation about most of us is already out there: “The monitoring of personal 
information is ubiquitous; its storage is so durable as to render one’s past 
undeletable . . . .”74  According to Professor Alessandro Acquisti, a scholar 
of privacy behavior and preferences, “There’s a sense that the fight to protect 
your data is unwinnable.”75  Noting that the methodologies designed by 
Google and other corporate data collectors and marketers “are designed to 
keep us ignorant,” Professor Zuboff argues that “[b]y now it’s very difficult 
                                                                    
 66.  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360–61 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 67.  See supra notes 61–64 and accompanying text. 
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 69.  Katz, 389 U.S. at 360–61 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
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https://opinion.bdnews24.com/2019/05/20/our-neurotic-privacy-paradox/ (emphasis added). 
 74. Acquisti et al., supra note 6, at 509.  
 75.  Senior, supra note 73. 
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to participate effectively in society without interfacing with these same chan-
nels that are supply chains for surveillance capitalism’s data flows.”76  For 
people concerned about personal privacy, the option of living a primitive, 
unconnected life in a cabin in the woods is not a particularly attractive alter-
native. 
B.  Corporations as Rights Defenders? 
Corporations have become predictable defenders of First and Fourth 
Amendment freedoms for their manufactured creations and the data they col-
lect.  Amazon has argued that not only are the data collected by its smart 
speakers protected, but so are the responses the AI devices offer.77  Are cor-
porations and internet service providers going to become the most vigorous 
defenders of freedom of speech and freedom against unlawful searches as 
they seek to protect what they consider their property—or what they consider 
their customers’ property, or, alternately, what privacy customers expect and 
rely upon when they purchase their products?78  Would progress mean secur-
ing better First and Fourth Amendment protections in the name of corpora-
tions rather than necessarily for individuals? 
One scholar contends that we are beginning to see “the creation of a new 
kind of speech legally and constitutionally.”79  Instead of a wall between in-
dividuals and the state, “ironically, in the new Information Society, prevent-
ing government from enacting speech-focused regulation means that power-
ful private interests will hold enormous power to shape how individuals 
interact with each other and perceive the world.”80  These are corporate dig-
ital intermediaries.  Whose speech is to be protected by laws and courts in 
the digital age?  There are commercial interests at stake, so is the speech that 
counts going to be the speech that is economically valuable?81 
Consultants to corporations now prepare guidance on how to secure in-
tellectual property rights in the Internet of Things and how to confront chal-
lenges corporations will face.82  They offer advice and projections on patent 
                                                                    
 76.  Laidler, supra note 13 (interviewing Professor Zuboff).  
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 80.  Id. at 241. 
 81.  Id. at 266, 273. 
 82.  See, e.g., Internet of Things (IoT), FINNEGAN, https://www.finnegan.com/en/work/indus-
tries/internet-of-things-iot.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2019); see also Rob Bloom, Protecting Your 
Intellectual Property in the Internet of Things, IPWATCHDOG (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.ipwatch-
dog.com/2017/10/05/protecting-intellectual-property-internet-of-things/id=88653/. 
   
100 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 79:88 
licensing activity.83  Property rights in the Internet of Things are expanding 
for corporate innovators, but it is rather unclear—though ethically, morally, 
and legally important—whether there are any emerging, robust, countervail-
ing rights to corporate ownership of personal data.84 
C.  The Idea of Personhood? 
Entities other than persons (such as corporations) today have speech 
rights, so would matters be helped at all by trying to extend free speech or 
other rights against search and seizure to other artificial creations—to artifi-
cial intelligence?  If citizens of the City of Toledo can grant legal personhood 
to algae-afflicted and beleaguered Lake Erie, could residents of a state grant 
personhood to a robot?85  This idea has been raised chiefly in the context of 
what is known as “strong” or “hard” AI—devices that try to adapt and learn, 
and it involves the use of limited liability companies.86  Doing so could invest 
AI devices that search databases with legal rights (and duties) so that their 
autonomy could be protected; the results of their searches, their privacy 
would be at issue—not that of their “owner.”87  If Alexa or Google Assistant 
owners have a paucity of rights, why would the device itself—even if smarter 
and more capable of learning in the future than it is today—fare better?  
Would the person who brought the device into the home reap any benefits of 
AI personhood, or would the point simply be to liberate the robot or device 
from its “master?”88  Personhood for smart devices does not seem to be es-
pecially promising for the owner of a smart device, and would not, therefore, 
be likely to improve the rights of the citizen in the face of surveillance, 
search, or seizure. 
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D.  State-Level Protections? 
Governor Jerry Brown signed the California Consumer Privacy Act of 
2018 that should lead, by 2020, to new protections for citizens.89  Consumers 
will be able to ask a business to “disclose the categories and specific pieces 
of personal information that it collects about the consumer,” some infor-
mation about the sources of the information gathered, and “categories of 
[third] parties with which the information is shared”; the consumer will be 
able to request that some personal information be deleted, can opt out of the 
selling of personal information, and more.90  Are state-level measures such 
as this a promising avenue in new and enhanced protections of privacy and 
protections against search and seizure of data?  It is uncertain how such 
measures will fare when challenged in federal courts.  In California v. Green-
wood,91 the fact that California state law barred police from conducting war-
rantless trash searches was not relevant to the Supreme Court’s finding that 
an individual had no reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage put out for 
collection by a third party; the evidence could be used in a narcotics convic-
tion.92  The Greenwood decision certainly casts some doubt on the robustness 
of state-level protections for data collected by Google Assistant, Alexa, or 
others in their family of devices—data that, coincidentally, crosses state lines 
and has commercial value.  The Court in Greenwood, held: 
 Individual States may surely construe their own constitutions as 
imposing more stringent constraints on police conduct than does 
the Federal Constitution.  We have never intimated, however, that 
whether or not a search is reasonable within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment depends on the law of the particular State in 
which the search occurs.93 
It is interesting to note that, in Carpenter, Justice Gorsuch took particu-
lar issue with the Greenwood decision, suggesting that his conception of pri-
vacy rights was more expansive than the Court found there.94 
E. Self-Incrimination and Personal Assistant Devices? 
There are looming Fifth Amendment self-incrimination issues involving 
cell phones and personal assistant devices.  Many new personal assistant de-
vices are designed to protect against intrusion by non-owners.  Encryption 
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for some devices involves password or thumbprint protection; others use fa-
cial recognition technology.  Courts have issued different rulings about 
whether individuals have ownership rights over their encrypted devices and 
data stored on their personal cell phones, computers, or other devices when 
law enforcement officials demand that these devices be unlocked.95 Courts 
seem to be permitting law enforcement officials to use someone’s biometric 
data to gain access to their data, though this issue has not come before the 
Supreme Court.96  A password or a voice seem to be different—so far.  It is 
not as obvious that law enforcement officials can demand that you enter your 
password in order to unlock data from your phone that they seek.97 
Smart devices come to recognize the voice commands of their owners, 
presumably remaining silent when others attempt to demand stored infor-
mation.  Can people be compelled to speak to activate or demand information 
from their personal assistant, which might include past searches, calendar 
events, or e-mails?  If there is a bright line at law between ownership of your 
voice, your password, your thumbprint, retina, or facial recognition, manu-
facturers of smart devices will have a market incentive to offer more law 
enforcement-proof means of logging in or securing information.98  There is, 
however, the possibility of interesting case law developing on self-incrimi-
nation via compelled speech that activates a home smart device. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
“[W]atched citizens are dominated by uncertainty, since they do not 
know where, when, about what and whom is watching over and collecting 
information about them . . . .”99  My family willingly accepted a Google As-
sistant into our home, yet we admit to occasional moments of paranoia when 
we believe our assistant is learning things about us when we thought it was 
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sleeping.  This is only a small part of the problem of big data, but self-sur-
veillance is another frontier in the changing landscape of privacy, search and 
seizure, and property rights and law. 
Perhaps we are headed into an Orwellian world.100  Unaccountable 
power, both public and private, is enhanced by opacity of data collection and 
use.101  Self-governance, the capacity of citizens to hold government account-
able, to protect their autonomy, and their identity as rights-bearing individu-
als are all affected.102  “The condition of privacy is dynamic . . . .  Rights to 
privacy are rights to the sociotechnical conditions that make the condition of 
privacy possible.”103 
An Orwellian outcome is not inevitable.  There is, at present, very little 
regulation of big data in the United States; “[s]pecific laws target specific 
concerns, but few systemic legal structures exist to police data collection or 
use.  ‘Big data law’ does not exist yet.”104  The situation is frequently likened 
to the Wild West.105  There is even less regulation of self-surveillance in the 
newer, developing Internet of Things, including lack of privacy protec-
tions.106  Good federal statutes could help, and, as Justice Gorsuch suggests, 
at least some members of the Court would welcome such legislative judg-
ments.107  A major regulatory step recently occurred in Europe with the im-
plementation of the European Union General Data Protection Regulation in 
May 2018.108  In the United States, it will require persistent public pressure 
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to achieve progress.  Professor Zuboff, who calls “for a rebirth of astonish-
ment and outrage,” notes that substantial majorities of survey participants in 
surveys conducted between 2008 and 2017 “support measures for enhanced 
privacy and user control over personal data.”109 
As I have argued, the meaning of privacy, search and seizure, and prop-
erty are in flux in this environment of big data.  If the Supreme Court were 
to insist that only it, and not Congress, can define these constitutional val-
ues,110 American citizens may be in for a great deal of trouble.  But in work-
ing to redefine these values as technology changes, citizens, activists, and 
legal scholars may be able to push toward a better resolution. 
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